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THE LAWYERS. By Martin Mayer. New York: Harper & Row. 
1967. Pp. xvii, 586. $8.95. 
Is stagnation a necessary and unavoidable concomitant of pro-
fessionalism? Do carefully prescribed prerequisites for entry into a 
calling preclude widespread dissatisfaction with norms which have 
been studied and grown accustomed to, but which have outlived 
their usefulness? Must the preparation essential for admission to 
the bar infuse an individual with hostility to change and a predis-
position favorable to the existing order? Is it impossible for lawyers 
to feel at ease when they are asked to espouse concepts which re-
quire them to abandon familiar techniques and principles? There 
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is a growing awareness within the legal profession that societal de-
mands today require a negative response to each of these questions. 
Many who have undertaken to probe the psyche of members of 
the bar have discerned a generally negative attitude toward inno-
vation.1 Lawyers who display satisfaction with the current modus 
vivendi appear to outnumber those who seek to trigger a broadly 
based metamorphosis. Absent careful scrutiny and analysis, com-
placency may at times pass for satisfaction and a feeling of helpless-
ness may be erroneously equated with disinterest. An investigator 
may be led to the conclusion that there is a natural and immutable 
correlation between bar membership and a desire to cling to the 
status quo. Numerous exceptions, however, belie the present valid-
ity of such a generalization. While many lawyers look askance at 
change per se, there are those who do not. There are members of 
the profession who do not shy away from painful questions about 
what should be altered or obliterated, and how rapidly the new can 
replace the old. For the well-being of the nation, our legal system, 
and the bar, it is essential that the doers prevail against the clingers, 
and the sooner, the better. 
Those dissatisfied with the contemporary bar and the content of 
our law can look for sustenance to a healthy movement that is now 
afoot. 2 The search for a meaningful interchange and ultimate agree-
ment between those deeply involved with the law and those who 
look at law from afar has attracted a growing number of protago-
nists within the last decade.3 Members of the judiciary have joined 
the fray. Legislators are now found among the leaders of those who 
urge that a multitude of diverse precedents and procedures be dis-
carded, and that fundamental as well as peripheral alterations be 
initiated. Both sides have shown concern and commitment in an 
arena which too often has taken on the semblance of a chasm with 
those intimately dealing with the law entrenched on one side and 
those removed from it perched on the other. Attempting to span 
the chasm now seems less foreboding; the challenge of concocting 
1. See, e.g., Ernst, Too Little Progress, in THE LIFE OF THE LAw 418-27 (1964); J. 
BENNETr, OUTLAWS IN SWIVEL CHAIRS 40 (1958): "Along with the rest of us, lawyers 
resist change. Archaic and clumsy as they are, the rules of court procedure and ad• 
ministration are something lawyers know and they find comfort in that knowledge. In 
resisting change lawyers oftentimes argue that there is really no need for reform." 
2. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, while serving as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey declared: "It is not to our credit that where legal reforms have occurred 
they generally have occurred under the impetus of a popular revolt of laymen against 
the quaint professional notion that courts exist primarily for the benefit of judges and 
lawyers and only incidentally for the benefit of the litigants and the state." J. BENNETr, 
supra note 1, at 40-41. 
3. En'li.n N. Griswold, alluding to the need of laymen and lawyers to band to-
gether to bring about change, has pointed out that lawyers are oftentimes thwarted 
by "the restraint of the canons barring advertising, representation of conflicting inter-
ests, and lay intermediaries." E. GRISWOLD, LAW AND LAWYERS IN THE UNITED STATES 37 
(1965). 
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formulae that will successfully bring the antagonists together is pres-
ently an inviting one.4 
It was with a degree of trepidation that this reviewer read the 
title page of The Lawyers. Having studied, practiced, and taught 
law, I was fearful that I was about to begin a painful plodding 
through an extensive diatribe against lawyers and the law. I was 
certain that I was about to find myself immersed in the usual blood-
letting which occurs when a layman summarizes his findings fol-
lowing his study of a particular profession. My fear waned as I read 
the author's dedication: "For Henry Mayer and Ruby P. Mayer of 
the New York Bar." A brief hiatus and some quick digging revealed 
that Henry and Ruby P. Mayer were the author's parents. I hy-
pothesized: A son of two lawyers who dedicated his observations 
about lawyers to his parents could not help but present his report 
with integrity and care. I found comfort in my assumptions that 
the author would not be tempted to inject vague and unkind gen-
eralizations, to overemphasize exceptions enticing to the reader, or 
to leave in the wake of his work freshly kindled flames of animosity 
toward la·wyers and the law.5 
Five hundred sixty-five delightful, readable, and informative 
pages later, I shared the author's sense of fulfillment. My hypoth-
eses were sustained. The Lawyers is a lucid, searching, and fair cri-
tique of the legal profession written by an informed, alert, and 
perceptive author. His overview of our legal system-which he dis-
cusses under the heading of Infrastructure-is intelligent and pene-
trating. The author's insistence that there is a need to alter some 
aspects of currently prescribed norms of professionalism is convinc-
ing. On the whole, his arguments calling for changes in the content 
of our procedural and substantive rules of law are also persuasive. 
4. Encouraging efforts can be seen; in particular, extensive probing by sociologists 
is to be commended. Individuals trained in this discipline have undertaken to study 
and analyze the make-up of the legal profession. By so doing, sociologists have served 
a dual purpose: They have made available to the general public materials depicting 
the inner workings of the legal profession, and their exposure of the foibles of the law 
and lawyers has precipitated an extensive introspective examination among members 
of the bar. A significant contribution to the literature in this area is E. SMIGEL, THE 
WALL STREET LAWYER (1964). Another interesting discourse on the legal profession is 
Freund, The Legal Profession, in THE PROFESSIONS IN AMERICA 35 (1965). 
5. Hostility toward lawyers can be traced to the colonial period. See, e.g., O. BARCK 
& H. LJ:FLER, COLONIAL AMERICA 423 (1958): 
A book about Pennsylvania and New Jersey, published in 1698, stated: Of Lawyers 
and Physicians I shall say nothing, because this country is peaceable and healthy. 
Long may it continue and never have occasion for the tongue of the one nor the 
pen of the other-both equally destructive of men's estates and lives." In the 
second quarter of the next century, Georgia was described as "a happy flourishing 
colony-free from that pest and scourage of mankind called lawyers." 
A more recent denunciation is typical: "Every thoughtful citizen who looks at the 
condition of law in America, the administration of justice, and the state of the legal 
profession, will find much cause for discouragement and some cause for alarm." M. 
GISNET, A LAWYER TELLS THE TRUTH 11 (1931). 
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This volume is a valuable supplement to the growing body of lit-
erature which supports many of the arguments presented by the 
proponents of changes in the law and the legal profession. 
The author captures the tone of American life in the 1960's 
by alluding to Frankfurter's assertion that "[o]ur society ... now 
more than ever, is a legal state in the sense that almost everything 
that takes place will sooner or later raise legal questions" (p. 13). 
Mayer links this statement with the fact that in 1967 there were 
approximately 300,000 lawyers in the United States-"one for every 
250 of the labor force" (p. 13). The first chapter is filled with myr-
iad statistics about the profession. For example, in an attempt to 
dispel the belief that most lawyers are to be found clustered in large 
metropolitan areas, Mayer writes that about one-half of the prac-
ticing attorneys work in or out of offices located in cities and towns 
populated by 200,000 persons or less. He also calls attention to the 
diminishing role of the private practitioner, a phenomenon not 
unique to the legal profession. 6 
Mayer's central theme reveals his refusal to deal with his subject 
in a superficial fashion. Repeatedly, he returns to the query: "What 
is law, what is justice, are they the same?" No single chapter is set 
aside for an exploration of this polemic, but no chapter escapes the 
author's insistence that the reader remain aware of the ever-present 
possibility of a dichotomy. The deleterious consequences of a signifi-
cant disparity between law and justice are examined from the diverse 
vantage points of the individual and society. Mayer declares that, as 
far as an individual plaintiff or defendant is concerned, a result is 
just if he or she wins and unjust if he or she loses. Few if any practi-
tioners will fail to concur with this observation. Individuals can sel-
dom draw neat lines between justice, law, and their own interests. 
Society, on the other hand, may indulge in the use of a less biased 
measuring rod. Law, in the positivist sense of the term, is composed 
of those norms which are enforced by the courts. When, in the opin-
ion of a nondisputant, a court's utilization of a norm has the effect of 
conferring a benefit upon one not entitled to receive it, the law may 
be said to be at odds with justice. Using a collective base for his defi-
nition, the author states that "[j]ustice is the visceral reaction of in-
formed people" (p. 545). On the basis of this definition, he differenti-
ates lawful from just results. 
To his credit, Mayer successfully avoids the attractive proposition 
that courts are universally obliged to use only the threads of justice 
as they weave their judgments. He succinctly calls attention to the 
danger of excessive concern with ad hoc, poorly reasoned reworking 
of existing court-enforced norms in order to attain "justice" in par-
6. For a discussion of the manner in which private practitioners conduct their 
practice in a large metropolis, see J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN (1962). 
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ticular cases by pointing out that "justice dies with its beneficiaries, 
while law remains" (p. 545). Somberly, he writes that individuals 
may have to be sacrificed in a particular case if one seeks to preserve 
"the stability and rationality of the law" (p. 545). The author sug-
gests no formula which would insure in every case a suitable accom-
modation between the competing demands of justice and an orderly 
legal system. 
Three of the book's fifteen chapters focus on troubled sectors of 
the profession: two chapters deal with the criminal lawyer and one 
with the negligence bar. In probing the conduct of the criminal bar, 
other commentators have punctured the euphoria of professionalism 
that surrounds the practice of the law.7 Mayer also does this, and for 
those who have never had the opportunity to observe criminal pro-
ceedings in the nation's largest cities, his vivid portrayal of how 
judges, lavvyers, and district attorneys conduct themselves as they go 
about their tasks within the confines of the New York City criminal 
courts will be enlightening, distasteful, upsetting, and at times hu-
morous. Unfortunately, the humor is the type which reflects the 
repulsiveness of particular aspects of the status quo. 
The author scores when he forces the reader to come to grips with 
the moral dilemma most criminal lawyers prefer to skirt: How can 
one accommodate his mm standards of propriety and society-oriented 
predilections while devoting his working hours to serving those who 
are bent upon engaging in antisocial conduct? Is it fair to assume 
that one whose sole task is defending those accused of having com-
mitted crimes personally espouses norms of conduct that fall short of 
the norms demanded by society? The author hints that the response 
to this inquiry may be a vigorous "yes." Ordinarily, criminal lawyers 
are not paid fees for their services; they extract them. Mayer notes 
that the success of a criminal lawyer is usually intertwined with the 
effectiveness of his "chasing network."8 It is not surprising to find 
that the author lauds legal aid, the public defender system, and neigh-
borhood law offices established under poverty programs. 
In terms of the content of the criminal law, the author astutely 
suggests that society is obliged to reconsider the kind of human 
conduct which may appropriately be labeled "criminal." Should an 
alcoholic, one who smokes marijuana, a narcotics addict, or a homo-
sexual be treated as a criminal? Mayer insists that legislators consider 
whether every "thou shalt" and "thou shalt not" ought to be treated 
as an adjunct of the criminal law. He suggests that in some areas of 
7. The relationship between a lawyer's conduct, his clientele, and the environment 
in which he performs his tasks is carefully examined in J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS 
66-83, 119-31 (1966). 
8. For a forceful presentation of the "grubbing" tactics of some members of the 
criminal bar see J. CARLIN, supra note 6, at 108-09. 
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the criminal law fewer "thou shalts" and "thou shalt nots" are in 
order. 
The content of tort law and the conduct of attorneys who prose-
cute and defend against tort claims are also critically examined. 
Dilatory practices of defense counsel, delays, inadequate compensa-
tion, the climbing costs of liability insurance, and its unavailability 
to segments of the population have given impetus to an unprece-
dented concern about tort law at state and federal levels of govern-
ment. A candid appraisal of the current state of tort law cannot be 
made unless one takes into account the many questionable-if not 
illegal-strategems employed by some attorneys who practice in this 
field. To remedy the disorder, numerous proposals have been put 
before the bar, the judiciary, legislatures, and the general public.9 
The author, always the realist, loses no time in pointing out the 
inherent difficulty facing the profession as its members undertake to 
resolve the dilemma inter se: he asserts that approximately twenty-
five per cent of the fees earned by the bar as a whole represents in-
come for services rendered in the processing of personal injury and 
property damage claims. Mayer concedes that lawyers labor diligently 
to earn these fees. Nevertheless, the consensus of the bar is that the 
sudden loss of a substantial part of this revenue would be catas-
trophic. Suggested alternatives to the present system which may 
diminish the earnings of attorneys understandably draw the fire of 
the negligence practitioners, and many other members of the bar 
are ready to stand alongside them to defend the banner of financial 
solvency. The banner, to be sure, remains in the background, out of 
sight of the casual observer.10 
9. A plan for effecting reform in the procedure those injured in automobile acci-
dents must follow in order to secure compensation is detailed in R. KEETON&: J. O'CON-
NELL, AFTER CARS CRASH (1967). 
10. The complex structure of our monetary society forces lawyers to admit candidly 
that they, like those engaged in other professional or nonprofessional activities, are 
obliged to guide themselves in order to earn the kind of monetary rewards that would 
permit them to satisfy their needs as well as reasonable aspirations. Within the last 
decade members of the legal profession have been urged to recoguize that if they are 
"to maintain their status in society, lawyers must increase their earnings.'' SPECIAL 
COMM. ON ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE OF THE ABA, THE 1958 LAWYER AND HIS 1938 
DOLLAR 5 (1958). It has been suggested that "the lawyer is an entrepeneur and thus 
must find indirect means of advancing his interests.'' J. CAVANAUGH, THE LAWYER IN 
SocIETY 3 (1963). Cavanaugh insists that a lawyer's standard of living and his profes-
sional standing are keyed to his ability as an entrepeneur. Attorneys may properly 
think in terms of "profit making" to the extent that they seek to attain "a level of 
earnings" which are "comparable" to those earned in other professions, but are 
obliged not to compromise the prescribed standards of ethics. SPECIAL CoMM. ON 
ECONOMICS OF LAW PRACTICE OF THE ABA, LAWYERS' ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND SOME BAR 
AssocIATION SOLUTIONS 15 (1959). It has been asserted that professionalism and con-
ducting one's activities so as to earn a suitable living are not mutually exclusive: 
Zealous of maintaining professional ideals, lawyers hesitate to utilize techniques 
that smack of commercial enterprise. However, without compromise, we can learn 
much from our business brothers in these days of increasing complexity and rising 
costs. In the interest of professional service, lawyers must free themselves of the 
inefficiency and lack of planning notable in the business aspects of practice. 
SPECIAL COMM. ON EcoNOl\lICS OF LAW PRACTICE, supra, at 6. 
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Continuing reassessment of the nation's resources and goals 
should lead to a beneficial scrutiny of the content and procedural 
aspects of the law of torts at various levels inside and outside of gov-
ernment. Nuances will be introduced; proposals that portend abrupt 
changes will be avoided. The altering process has already begun, and 
Mayer considers a number of proposed changes. 
Numerous and extensive studies have been made of the various 
divisions of American education, ranging from pre-kindergarten 
through graduate training. Some sacred cows have been sacrificed at 
the altar of hoped-for efficiency. An example of innovation at the 
graduate level is the establishment of the Master of Philosophy degree 
by Yale University. In this age of conscious searching for techniques 
and tools to enhance the prospective utility of a student's education, 
law professors have been keenly aware of the complexity of preparing 
young men and women to engage in the practice of law. Legal educa-
tors have sought answers to the following questions: Will the 1999 
lawyer be equipped to carry on his calling if he is trained in the 
tradition made famous by Langdell? Is the Socratic method a suitable 
technique to teach those who will have to cope with problems foreign 
to the teachers?11 
Mayer devotes a chapter to an examination of the nation's law 
schools and current means of imparting knowledge of the law. He 
focuses his attention on the manner in which law schools are seeking 
to make legal training a more effective as well as a more meaningful 
experience. The author feels that law professors ordinarily view 
their charge in the following terms: Shape the mental processes of 
your students so that they will think like lawyers when they have 
completed law school. He discerns a shift from the case-based teach-
ing technique to what might be called a clinical, or problem-solving, 
format. The latter form of pedagogy requires the student to engage 
in realistic legal thinking in a realistic setting. The study of the law 
under the "problem" approach is enmeshed with a search for answers 
where the law currently offers none, or at best unworkable solutions. 
"Problem" teaching subordinates the importance of precedent and 
the reading of cases; social problems and legislative mandates are 
emphasized. 
Mayer's discussion of the operation of the legal profession is 
analytical. He fragments the total output of the profession into four 
functional categories: counseling, negotiating, advocating, and draft-
ing. He is not convinced that lawyers are per se qualified to counsel 
in a wide area of diverse subjects, although they ordinarily do so; 
nor does the author believe that one trained in the law will invariably 
possess the talent and capacity to excel in negotiation. Advocacy, he 
insists, may at times best be left to those who are not lawyers, since 
ll. Perspectives of possible future patterns of legal education appear in A. SUTHER-
LAND, THE LAW A'r HilVARD 360-69 (1967), 
1332 Michigan Law Review 
reliance on lawyers may render the resolution of a dispute more 
difficult than it otherwise would have been. In Mayer's opinion, the 
reason for the existence of lawyers is to be found in the fourth 
category-the drafting of instruments. "The one necessary societal 
function of the lawyer-the reason why it is necessary to license 
lawyers and to demand that all entrants to the profession pass a bar 
examination-is that the lawyer ·writes enforceable contracts" (p. 42). 
He contends that "pieces of paper-wills, trusts, agreements, mort-
gages, deeds, certificates of incorporation, leases, agreements to pur-
chase or sell, warrants and so forth-must stand up. The lawyer 
assures that they will" (p. 42). 
Is the author's "glorification" of the drafting aspect of legal prac-
tice realistic? Can lawyers really be certain that documents will 
"stand up" as the content of the law and public policy changes? In 
our shifting milieu, time and again one finds that for good reason, 
at least as far as a court is concerned, words go for naught and con-
tracts are construed in an unanticipated fashion.12 The Uniform 
Commercial Code proscribes unconscionable contracts and empha-
sizes business practices in construing contracts.18 Courts often read 
"good faith" requirements into contracts which make no reference to 
"good faith."14 Here one readily perceives the pertinence of the 
author's concern with the difference between law and justice; un-
fortunately, he fails to pay sufficient attention to this aspect of his 
thinking in the portion of his book dealing with the lawyer as a 
draftsman. 
Mayer has made available to individuals not trained in the law a 
captivating book that will permit such persons intelligently to 
criticize a profession that is not known for its willingness to expose 
its inner workings to the general public. The author has done an 
outstanding job in handling a difficult subject in depth; his journal-
istic style makes reading this work a sheer pleasure. Indeed, the 
book may rank as one of the more significant factors contributing to 
th~ catharsis now taking place within the legal profession. 
Edwin W. Tucker, 
Professor of Business Law, 
University of Connecticut 
12. A contrary view is presented in J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949). Frank con• 
tends that judges do not simply go about enforcing agreements as written. Frank also 
writes: "The judge, at his best, is an arbitrator, a 'sound man' who strives to do 
justice to the parties by exercising a wise discretion with reference to the particular 
circumstances of this case." J. FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND 178 (1930). 
13. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [UCC] § 2-302. 
14. The UCC similarly injects the obligation of "good faith" in certain kinds of 
contractual agreements; e.g., § 1-208 provides: 
A term providing that one party or his successor in interest may accelerate pay-
ment or performance or require collateral or additional collateral "at will" or 
"when he deems'himself insecure" or in words of similar import shall be construed 
to mean that he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith believes that 
the prospect of payment or performance is impaired. The burden of establishing 
lack of good faith is on the party against whom the power has been i:xercised. 
